

missions to advise the respective Foreign Offices of the substance of the statement which the President would release at approximately noon EDT on US action to be taken under the Security Council resolution of June 25. To Moscow as information only. (Tel 3124 to London, etc.) - - - - - (TAB 1)

2. 1:00 a.m. -- The Department instructed Charge Strong at Taipei to deliver an Aide-Memoire to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek personally, stating that the US Fleet had been ordered to prevent an attack against Formosa, and that the US was confident the Generalissimo would cooperate by ordering a cessation of his operations against the mainland. (Telcan 39) - - - - - (TAB 2)

3. 4:24 a.m. -- Charge Gullion at Saigon reported the consensus of opinion in Indo-China was that UN or US action would be unavailing in Korea, that the Soviet aim to complete the conquest of continental Asia was now manifest, that the US counter-action would be a test of Indo-China's chances for aid when its turn came. (Tel 513) - - - - - (TAB 3)

4. 8:55 a.m. -- Embassy Moscow reported that the Indian Counsellor was seeking information on how far the US was prepared to go both within and without the UN to assist the Republic of Korea; Counsellor Kapus said India wanted to know "whether US was prepared to risk World War III over Korea"; Madame Pandit was such a "bust" in Washington she probably wouldn't be able to find this out. (Tel 1743) - - - - - (TAB 4)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY

DATE 5/12/61

RDS/for IDS ☐ EXT. DATE

TS AUTH. REASON(S)

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

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PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS

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03:15:07:030

June 27, 1950 (Continued)

5. 9:08 a.m. -- Ambassador Douglas and Counselor Holmes endorsed the course of action outlined in (1). They supported Moscow Embassy's view (Log, June 26, Entry 6) that it would be preferable not to attribute responsibility to the Soviets publicly for the North Korean aggression. (Tel 3636) - - - - - (TAB 5)

6. 9:43 a.m. -- Charge Strong at Taipei reported delivery of the message and aide-memoire to Chiang Kai-Shek, who promised a reply following detailed study. (Tel 991) The Counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Washington was handed a copy of the communication to the Generalissimo the afternoon of June 27. - - - - - (TAB 6)

7. 11:24 a.m. -- Ambassador Kirk reported his view that "Soviets will not engage in war with U.S. if we take a firm stand and effective action to assist ROK immediately to halt and throw back North Korean aggression." He saw no reason as yet to revise the Embassy estimate of April 24 that the Soviets did not wish to risk war with the U.S. for the present. (Tel 1748) - - - - - (TAB 7)

8. 11:30 a.m. -- The President, Secretary of State, civil and military officials of the Defense Establishment, Congressional leaders and Messrs. Rusk, Matthews, Jassun and McFall met in the Cabinet room at the White House at 11:30 a.m. The President read the statement subsequently released to the press. In reply to questions by congressmen Secretary Acheson stated that it was perfectly clear to other Governments that U.S. action was being taken under the UN, and that with respect to Russia the approach made by Ambassador Kirk was intended to avoid engaging Soviet prestige publicly. (Memo by Jassun) - - - - - (TAB 8)

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9. 11:39 a.m. -- Ambassador Jarman reported from Canberra that Minister of External Affairs Spender was "puzzled" by the manner of a USUN inquiry to Australian Delegate Shann as to what degree of support Australia would give to four alternative courses of action which might be taken in the Korean crisis. Jarman was embarrassed by lack of information; he had had thus far only the repeat of Seoul's Tel 925, the first report on the attack. (Tel 219) - - - - - (TAB 9)

10. 12:00 noon -- The Department sent to USUN the text of the draft Resolution to be introduced in the Security Council that afternoon calling for armed assistance to the Republic of Korea. (Tel 332) - - - - - (TAB 10)

11. 12:05 p.m. -- Ambassador Kirk reported he failed in five attempts to get an appointment with Gromyko and had had the message delivered by a subordinate official of the Embassy to an officer of the Protocol Section of the Soviet Foreign Office. (Tels 1749 and 1769) - - - - - (TAB 11)

12. 3:00 p.m. -- Ambassador Austin reported to the Security Council that the U.S. was "prepared as a loyal member of the UN to furnish assistance to the ROK," submitted the U.S. draft resolution for adoption, and presented President Truman's statement on action to be taken by the U.S. The American resolution calling for armed assistance to the Korean Republic was adopted 7 to 1 with 2 abstentions. (SC Official Records) - - - - - (Annex A)

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June 27, 1950 (Continued)

13. 4:00 p.m. — Mr. Ross telephoned the Secretary from the White House to convey the President's approval for a release of the information that the US had communicated with the Soviet Government to request it to use its influence to effect a withdrawal of the North Korean forces. (Memo and Press Release) - - - (TAB 12)

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Annexed Documents and Background Information

- A. Security Concil Records, No. 16, June 27, 1950. (TAB A)
- B. Memorandum for the Secretary (FE: Mr. Bond) on 1) Arms
shipments to Korea under MDAP: (2) Intelligence estimates prior to
June 25. (TAB B)
- C. PS Summary of Public Comment on Korean War, 8 a.m.,
June 27, 1950. (TAB C)
- D. Statement by the President. (TAB D)

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Summary of Actions and Decisions - June 28, 1950

(All entries are in EDT; on incoming telegrams the time of receipt is used.)

1. 8:07 a.m. -- The Charge at Taipei reported receipt of an informal statement from the Chinese Foreign Office that, in accordance with the American request (Cf. Entries 2 and 6, June 27 log), a cease fire would be issued in the afternoon and a formal communication delivered to the U.S. the next day. (Tel 992) - - - - (TAB 1)
2. 8:38 a.m. -- The Charge at Taipei reported that the Ministry of National Defense Liaison Office in Formosa had informed the attachés that the Chinese Government accepted "all major points" in the U.S. aide-memoire but wished to work out some details with the Commander of the Seventh Fleet. (Tel 999) - - - - (TAB 2)
3. 8:56 a.m. -- Moscow Embassy conveyed that it welcomed the public statement by the President of the previous day: "In our view, this firm stand exactly what is necessary to serve notice to Soviets that Communists have gone too far." (Tel 1754) - - - - (TAB 3)
4. 9:30 a.m. -- Officials at the Under Secretary's meeting, when questioned, told Secretary Acheson that the reactions of diplomatic representatives in Washington were generally favorable to the U.S. decision. (UM M-212) - - - - - (TAB 4)
5. 10:30 a.m. -- Mr. Perkins asked the British Ambassador to inquire of his government whether it was in a position to contribute military assistance and whether it would act to apply economic sanctions to North Korea. Ambassador Franks said that the omission